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Abstract
This paper presents a novel approach for checking route oscillation of border gateway protocol (BGP) quickly, by which the 
privacy of routing policies of autonomous system (AS) can be respected. Firstly, route update chain tag (RUCT) is constructed to
track the forwarding of update report, and local routing library is made to record the changing history of update report. Then 
route oscillation can be identified by analyzing correlative state of RUCT and local routing library. The characteristic of this
approach is that an arbitrary AS can check route oscillation alone only by sharing its network ID, which greatly respects the pri-
vacy of routing policies for each AS. This paper shows that both looping in RUCT and consecutive positive-negative report in 
local record are sufficient conditions for route oscillation. Comparative experiments demonstrate the availability and efficiency 
of the proposed approach. 
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1. Introduction1
The border gateway protocol (BGP)[1] is a path vec-
tor protocol for exchanging routing information be-
tween autonomous systems (ASs), which is currently 
the only inter-domain routing protocol applied to the 
Internet. BGP allows each AS to independently for-
mulate and regulate its routing policies for reasons of 
local rationality, and override the rationality of whole 
network. It is reported that BGP is usually weak in 
operational and security issue as shown in Ref.[2]. 
Current research on BGP focuses on exposing and 
resolving both operational and security concerns. Op-
erational concerns[3-5] deal with convergence delay, 
routing stability and performance of BGP, while security 
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research[6-8] relates to the integrity, confidentiality and 
authentication of BGP messages. These two fields of 
operational issues and security research are inherently 
connected. Route oscillation, an important factor to 
impact routing stability, has been the focus of many 
efforts. BGP route oscillation can significantly degrade 
the end-to-end network performance and depress the 
overall efficiency of network. 
Broadly speaking, this problem can be addressed 
either statically or dynamically. A static solution would 
rely on programs to pre-analyze routing policies and 
verify that they do not contain policy conflict which 
will lead to route oscillation. For example, Routing 
Arbiter project is designed in Ref.[9] to check route 
oscillation. This project consists of three elements: 1) a 
common description language for routing policy speci-
fication; 2) a distributed registry system that allows 
providers to publish their policies in this language; and 
3) a suite of tools for analyzing the impact of provider 
routing policies on Internet traffic. However, it is dif-
ficult to get detailed routing policies and path informa-
tion, and research of Ref.[10] indicates that checking 
for various global convergence conditions is either 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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NP-complete or NP-hard. Considering this problem, 
Refs.[11]-[12] improve the acquiring mechanism of 
routing policies and present subnet-relationship-based 
approaches for detecting policy conflict. The dynamic 
solution is a certain mechanism to suppress or com-
pletely prevent BGP route oscillation at run time by 
extending BGP protocol. For example, route flap 
damping (RFD) presented in Ref.[13] is a dynamic 
approach for preventing route oscillation. RFD in-
cludes two important parameters, route penalty and 
threshold, by which route update will be restrained if 
penalty value exceeds the upper limit of threshold, or 
be restarted if penalty value falls back to the lower 
limit of threshold. Ref.[14] shows that RFD can sig-
nificantly exacerbate the convergence times of rela-
tively stable routes, then makes some improvements on 
scheme. However, RFD cannot really eliminate route 
oscillation which arises from policy conflict. It can 
only make oscillation run in slow motion[15]. Ref.[16] 
presents a mechanism to tradeoff policy independence 
and route stability. This mechanism ensures policy 
independence as soon as possible and prefers to route 
stability in need. In addition, it is necessary to obtain 
enough route information of subnets. Ref.[17] pro-
poses simple path vector protocol (SPVP) and con-
structs dispute direct graph according to route history 
which is involved in update report. By SPVP, real-time 
detection of route oscillation can be conducted, but 
routing policies of subnets have to be shared and net-
work cost of BGP should be increased. 
As shown above, it is the same characteristic for 
static solution and dynamic solution that each subnet 
has to share policy information of itself and cooperate 
to resolve route oscillation problem. In other words, 
one subnet cannot check route oscillation only by itself 
alone. Both solutions can ensure the stability of BGP 
route, but override the privacy of routing policies of 
subnets. However, BGP is vulnerable in nature[18]. Ref. 
[19] indicates that clustering network, such as global 
information grid (GIG), has more reasons to be con-
cerned about BGP security than the commercial Inter-
net. It also denotes that keeping the confidentiality of 
peering sessions is urgent for BGP security. Therefore, 
many subnets of GIG or space information network[20]
do not widely share their routing policies, or only pub-
lish incomplete specifications considering security and 
privacy. In this case, it is unfeasible for current solu-
tions to check route oscillation in those networks. 
Considering the privacy of routing policies, Ref.[21] 
presents an approach based on dispute direct graph, in 
which detailed path information is replaced by relative 
preference. Though this approach respects the privacy 
of subnets, it is difficult to optimize the threshold for 
relative preference conflict and it will take a long time 
to detect route oscillation. Ref.[22] introduces a dis-
tributed method to dynamically check BGP route os-
cillation. According to this approach, each node will 
create and forward an oscillation flag, called TOKEN, 
when detecting an oscillation on local path. If the 
TOKEN comes full circle back to source node, it is 
affirmed that this route oscillation should occur at 
source node. Because both local path oscillation and 
oscillation cycle solely have to be checked, this ap-
proach will spend more time in resolving route oscilla-
tion too. Moreover, it is necessary to encrypt TOKEN 
for confidentiality, which is more complex. Ref.[23] 
proposes a distributed mechanism to eliminate route 
oscillation. This approach enforces a global preference 
value on each optional path and prioritizes those paths 
according to their preference values firstly. The pref-
erence value of selected path should be increased by 1 
if policy conflict happens. Though this mechanism 
need not forward any policy information of local node 
and greatly respects the privacy of routing policies, the 
ultimate route tree is not optimal, in which many op-
tional paths with higher priority are discarded by error. 
Ref.[24] offers an approach to check oscillation on 
source node where routing policies have been modi-
fied. But it is not applicable to other nodes except 
source node, and the path history has to be encrypted 
too. 
This paper presents a novel approach to rapidly 
check route oscillation on arbitrary subnet. It greatly 
respects privacy of route policies, and each subnet 
should only share simple network ID rather than pub-
lish detailed path information. 
2. Sufficient Condition of Route Oscillation 
Let G=(V, E) be a directed graph to show overall 
network in which each subnet is acted as a node, 
where V is the set of all nodes and E the set of all 
edges’ connecting nodes. The direction of edge is de-
cided as follows. 
Definition 1  For u,vęV, node v is neighbor of u,
and euvęE. If path information advertised by v is ac-
cepted by Adj-RIB-In of u, the direction of edge euv
is vou, called transmission edge. Moreover, euv is 
called input transmission edge for u and output trans-
mission edge for v.
Definition 2  If path information advertised by 
both v and u is refused by each other, then euv=H, called 
empty edge.
Definition 3 vts denotes the optimal path for v at 
time t. Ov 1( )vp  represents priority of 1vp , which is a 
feasible path of v.
For the sake of simplicity, this paper considers only 
essential characteristic of BGP, and assume that 1) 
overlapping route and aggregation are ignored, 2) 
MED and ORGIN attributes are ignored, 3) there is 
only one connection between ASs, 4) the matter about 
interior border gateway protocol (IBGP) is ignored, 5) 
ID of each AS is unique. 
Given G=(V, E) in which routing policies are stable 
at each node initially, u,vęV, euvęE. At time t, the 
optimal path of v is changed for some reasons. Then v
advertises an update report rv=(n 1vp ,p 2vp ) to neighbor 
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nodes along euv=(u,v), where 1
vp  is the current optimal 
path that will be selected by v and 2
vp  is the former 
optimal path that should be withdrawn by v. Suppose 
that both 1
vp  and 2
vp  should be accepted by Adj- 
RIB-In of u (or else their priority is regarded as 0 at u).
According to local policies of u, there are four cases of 
response output from u after decision-making at time 
t+1, shown in Table 1.  
Table 1  Response output of u after receiving rv
1
u
ts u
ts
pu 1( )
vuv p
pu — 1( ( ) , )u v ur uv p p n p
2( )
vuv p 2( , ( ) )
u u vr p uv p n p 1 2( ( ) , ( ) )u v vr uv p uv p n p
In Table 1, pu is the path with the highest priority 
among all feasible paths which do not include node v
in Adj-RIB-In of u, contrary to (uv)pv. The four cases 
are presented as follows: 
(1) If uts = p
u and 1
u
ts  = p
u, which means Ou(pu)>
Ou((uv) 1vp ) and Ou(pu)>Ou((uv) 2vp ), the current opti-
mal path of u is not affected by the change of optimal 
path at node v. Then u does not advertise any update 
report to neighbor nodes after receiving vr .
(2) If uts = p
u and 1
u
ts  = (uv) 1
vp , which means 
Ou((uv) 1vp )>Ou(pu)>Ou((uv) 2vp ), the optimal path of u
should be changed to (uv) 1
vp  after receiving rv. Then 
u will advertise an update report ru=(n(uv) 1vp ,ppu)
after decision-making (see Fig.1(a)). 
(3) If uts = (uv) 2
vp  and 1
u
ts  = p
u, which means 
Ou((uv) 2vp )>Ou (pu)>Ou ((uv) 1vp ), the optimal path of u
should be changed to pu after receiving rv. Then u will 
advertise an update report ru=(npu,p(uv) 2vp ) after de-
cision-making (see Fig.1(b)). 
(4) If uts =(uv) 2
vp  and 1
u
ts  =(uv) 1
vp , which means 
Ou((uv) 1vp )>Ou(pu) and Ou((uv) 2vp )>Ou(pu), the optimal 
path of u should be changed to (uv) 1
vp  after receiving 
rv. Then u will advertise an update report ru=(n(uv) 1vp ,
p(uv) 2vp ) after decision-making (see Fig.1(c)). 
Fig.1  Response output of u after receiving rv.
Definition 4  Provided that both 1
vp  and 2
vp  are 
feasible paths of v, and rv=(n 1vp ,p 2vp ) is a route up-
date report of v, then the other update report (n 2vp ,
p 1vp ) is negative report of rv, denoted as vr .
Theorem 1  For G=(V, E), u,vęV, euvęE. If at 
time t the route update report rv results in that u adver-
tises ru, then at next time t+1 the report vr  should 
result in the fact that u advertises ur .
Proof  At time t, v advertises an update report 
rv=(n 1vp , p 2vp ) to u, where 1vp  is the current optimal 
path that will be selected by v and 2
vp  the former 
optimal path that should be withdrawn by v. Suppose 
both 1
vp  and 2
vp  should be accepted by Adj-RIB-In 
of u (or else their priority is regarded as 0 at u). Ac-
cording to local policies of u, there are four cases of 
response output at time t+1.
(1) If Ou(pu)> 1(( ) )u vuv pO  and Ou(pu)> 2(( ) )u vuv pO ,
the current optimal path of u is not affected by the 
changing of optimal path at node v. As shown in 
Fig.2(a), u does not advertise any update report at time 
t and t+1. It is not in conflict with this theorem. 
(2) If Ou((uv) 1vp )>Ou (pu)>Ou ((uv) 2vp ), the current 
optimal path of u is uts = p
u at time t. After receiving 
rv=(n 1vp ,p 2vp ), u should update optimal path to 
(uv) 1
vp  and advertise ru=(n(uv) 1vp ,ppu) to neighbor 
nodes. At time t+1, the current optimal path of u is 
1 1( )
u v
ts uv p   and v advertises vr =(n 2vp ,p 1vp )
again. As shown in Fig.2(b), u should update optimal 
path to pu after decision-making and advertise 
ur =(npu, p(uv) 1vp ) to neighbor node again. The theo-
rem is true. 
(3) If Ou((uv) 2vp )>Ou (pu)>Ou ((uv) 1vp ), the current 
optimal path of u is uts =(uv) 2
vp  at time t. After re-
ceiving rv=(n 1vp ,p 2vp ), u should update optimal path 
to pu and advertise ru=(npu,p(uv) 2vp ) to neighbor 
nodes. At time t+1, the current optimal path of u is 
1
u
ts  =p
u and v advertises vr =(n 2vp ,p 1vp ) again. As 
shown in Fig.2(c), u should update optimal path to 
(uv) 2
vp  after decision-making and advertise ur =
(n(uv) 2vp , ppu) to neighbor node again. The theorem 
is true. 
(4) If Ou((uv) 1vp )>Ou(pu) and Ou((uv) 2 )vp >Ou(pu),
the current optimal path of u is uts =(uv) 2
vp  at time t.
After receiving rv=(n 1vp ,p 2vp ), u should update op-
timal path to (uv) 1
vp  and advertise ru=(n(uv) 1vp ,
p(uv) 2 )vp ) to neighbor nodes. At time t+1, the 
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current optimal path of u is 1
u
ts  =(uv) 1
vp  and v ad-
vertises   =(n 2vp ,p 1vp ) again. As shown in Fig.2(d), 
u should update optimal path to (uv) 2
vp  after deci-
sion-making and advertise    =(n(uv) 2vp , p(uv) 1vp ) to 
neighbor node again. The theorem is true. 
The theorem has been proved. 
Fig.2  Response output of u after receiving consecutive positive-negative report ( vr  and vr ).
Definition 5  Given G=(V, E) in which routing 
policies are stable at each node, there is a series of 
neighbor nodes u,v,…,w, …, xęV, as shown in Fig.3. 
Sometimes update report vr  of v results in the fact 
that u advertises ur , which will bring about a series of 
report output in turn, such as rw and rx. This series of 
report outputs is called route update chain, denoted as 
rvoruo…orwo…orx.
Fig.3  Route update chain. 
Lemma 1  Suppose that route policies of all nodes 
are stable and have no conflict. If the update report 
output rv results in rvoruo…orx at time t, the nega-
tive report output vr  will result in vr o ur o…
o xr  at the next time t+1.
Proof  According to the number of transmission 
edges of every node, there are two cases as follows: 
(1) If maximum number of transmission edge is 2 as 
shown in Fig.4(a), which means each node has trans-
mission edges with two neighbor nodes at most, this 
lemma is true according to Theorem 1. 
(2) If the number of transmission edges is more than 
2 at some nodes, for example z and y as shown in 
Fig.4(b), we assume that path information carried by rz
Fig.4  Examples of route update chain with different num-
ber of transmission edge at each node.
vr
ur
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is accepted by Adj-RIB-In of y. Assume that (S,T) is a 
cut which partitions all nodes in route update chain 
into T and S, where T comprises those nodes from y to 
z and exz/euy are transmission edges crossing cut (S,T).
Because route policies of all nodes are stable and have 
no conflict, T should have a stable route tree after re-
ceiving ru at time t. Then T will advertise rT to node x,
which means ru orT. On the contrary, if receiving ur
at time t+1, i.e. ru is canceled, T should recover former 
route status and cancel rT too, which means ur o Tr .
This lemma is also true according to Theorem 1. 
The lemma has been proved. 
Theorem 2  Given G=(V, E) in which routing poli-
cies are stable at each node, there is a series of 
neighbor nodes u,v,…, xęV. Suppose that these nodes 
have no conflict with route policies except v. At time t,
the route update report rv results in route update chain 
rvoruo…orx. If 1) v is a neighbor node of x too, and 
the direction of edge evx is xov, 2) the last-of-chain rx
also results in the fact that v advertises another nega-
tive report   , i.e. rxo  , route update chain will 
loops, which is composed of rvoruo…orx and 
vr o ur o…o xr . Along this loop chain, the same 
update report will appear repeatedly at v, which means 
route oscillation happens to v.
Proof  As shown in Fig.5, the solid line represents 
route update chain rvoruo…orx, and the broken line 
represents negative router update chain vr o ur o…
o xr .
Fig.5  Route update loop chain. 
If rxo  , then   orv according to Theorem 1. 
rx is not only the tail of chain rvoruo…orx but 
also the head of chain vr o ur o… o xr , contrary 
to xr . So r
voruo…orx and vr o ur o… o xr
will form a loop chain. Then route update report will 
transfer forwards in terms of  
v x v x v
x v
r r r r r
r r
o o o o o o o o
o o
" " "
"
It is clear that rv will appear repeatedly at node v,
which means route oscillation happens. 
The theorem has been proved. 
Lemma 2  For G=(V, E), u,v,…,xęV, suppose 
that route policies of all nodes are stable and have no 
conflict except v. At time t, node v advertises route 
update report rv through output transmission edge. If rv
results in the fact that v will receive another report rx
by which v should advertise    again, viz. consecu-
tive reports (rv,   ) is detected at node v, it is assured 
that route oscillation will occur at node v.
Proof  If rvorx and rxo   at time t, the chain 
v xr ro  will be generated at time t+1 according to 
Lemma 1. According to Theorem 2, rvorx and 
vr o xr  will form a loop chain, which means route 
oscillation will occur at node v.
The lemma has been proved. 
According to Lemma 2, a sufficient condition of 
route oscillation is that node detects both loop chain 
and consecutive positive-negative report in local re-
cord, while detailed routing policies and path informa-
tion of other nodes are not required. 
3. Design and Implementation
3.1.  Approach design 
For G=(V, E), u,v,…, xęV, suppose that route poli-
cies of all nodes are stable and have no conflict except 
v. According to Lemma 2, if 1) consecutive posi-
tive-negative report (rv,   ) is detected at node v, 2) rv
and    are involved in the same route update chain, it 
is assured that route oscillation will occur at node v.
Therefore, we present report update chain tag 
(RUCT) to judge whether rv and    are involved in 
the same route update chain. RUCT is a network ID set 
of nodes which are traversed by forwarding update 
report. When network ID of one node has been in-
cluded by RUCT, it is affirmable that this node should 
have been involved in this route update chain. So this 
chain should loop if this node advertises update report 
again. In addition, we make local library to record 
changing history of route update report, by which the 
consecutive positive-negative reports can be detected. 
For an arbitrary node, such as v, we make rules as fol-
lows: 
(1) When receiving route update report rx, v will 
advertise update report rv and insert rv into local library 
if the current optimal path is changed after route deci-
sion-making. If RUCT is not accompanied by rx, v has 
to create RUCT and add local network ID to RUCT. 
Then v will advertise rv together with RUCT to other 
neighbor nodes. 
(2) After receiving rv together with RUCT, neighbor 
node firstly makes decision to check whether the op-
timal path will be changed. If there is no change, it is 
unnecessary to transfer forwards RUCT, which means 
that RUCT should end here. Otherwise, this node 
should add its network ID to RUCT and revise local 
record. Then this node should transfer forwards RUCT 
together with the new update report. 
(3) If receiving update report again, v should judge 
whether the optimal path will be changed or not. If it is 
not changed, v stops forwarding RUCT similarly. Oth-
vrvr
vr
vr xr
vr
vr
vr
vr
vr
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erwise, v should get the new update report vr c  firstly, 
and check 1) whether vr c  is equal to vr  or not. If 
yes, the consecutive positive-negative report is de-
tected. If no, v should refresh vr c  into local history 
library; 2) whether the received RUCT includes net-
work ID of v or not. If yes, rv and vr c  have already 
been involved in the same chain. Otherwise, v should 
add local network ID to RUCT. Only if both 1) and 2) 
are true, can we conclude that route oscillation will 
occur at node v. Otherwise, v should forward vr c  to-
gether with RUCT. 
According to the above rules, each node should only 
add local network ID to RUCT rather than share de-
tailed routing policies or path information. Whether 
route oscillation would occur at each node can be 
judged by checking RUCT and local history record, 
which improves the security and secrecy of information. 
3.2. Extending BGP 
RUCT consists of network IDs, and we can extend 
BGP to construct and transfer forwards RUCT. The 
additional routing parameter of BGP can be assigned 
to a special path attribute of route update report. A path 
attribute consists of one byte of flag, one byte of code, 
one or two bytes of length and multiple bytes of data. 
Then we extend an optional non-transitive path attrib-
ute to express RUCT, named PRUCT. 
As shown in Fig.6, attribute code of PRUCT is 31 
(1F in hexadecimal), attribute length of PRUCT is two 
bytes (which is enough to be fit for most applications), 
and attribute data of PRUCT is loaded by a series of 
network IDs. 
Fig.6  Format for PRUCT. 
3.3. Pseudo code 
We design the pseudo code for each node to imple-
ment approach based on RUCT, shown in Fig.7. 
Fig.7  Pseudo code. 
For an arbitrary node u, maybe the optimal path 
changes when update report is received or local routing 
policies are modified. Firstly, we get the new route 
update report rnew and detect whether RUCT has been 
carried or not. If not, it means that the changing of op-
timal path is due to modification of local routing poli-
cies or network topology. Then RUCT should be cre-
ated and transferred forwards together with rnew. If 
RUCT is carried, we will go on to check whether 
RUCT includes local network ID or not. If RUCT does 
not include local ID, it is necessary to add local ID to 
RUCT and transfer forwards RUCT together with rnew.
And the history record rh should be updated with rnew.
If RUCT includes local ID, it means that the update 
report chain loops. Then we will go on to check 
whether rh is equal to newr  or not. If rh= newr , it is 
assured that route oscillation should happen according 
to Lemma 2. Otherwise, rh should be updated with rnew,
and RUCT should be transferred forwards without be-
ing modified. 
4. Simulation Experiment
We demonstrate this approach on traditional model. 
As shown in Fig.8, this model consists of four nodes. 
Each node represents a subnet, and Node 0 means des-
tination. The numeral arrays beside nodes are all feasi-
ble paths, which array by priority from the top down. 
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Fig.8  Route oscillation model.
We simulate this model by C language, and the re-
sult is shown in Fig.9. 
Initially the whole network has a stable routing tree 
((10), (20), (310)), which is tagged by arrow as shown 
in Fig.8. Sometimes, the routing policies of Node 1 are 
modified, where the priority of path (120) is adjusted 
to be higher than priority of path (10). Then route os-
cillation will happen. 
At time 0, the whole network has a stable routing 
tree.
At time 1, the policies of Node 1 are modified, 
where the optimal path is changed from (10) to (120). 
Node 1 will create update report r1=(n(120),p(10)) and 
RUCT={1}, and will transfer them forwards to other 
nodes. In addition, the history record of Node 1 will be 
updated with 1hr =(n(120),p(10)).
At time 2, Node 2 does not respond after receiving 
Fig.9  Simulation result (the path with underline means that owner node should advertise update report). 
update report. On the other hand, Node 3 will change 
optimal path after decision-making. It is obviously that 
RUCT={1} does not include network ID of Node 3 
and the history record of Node 3 is empty. Node 3 
should change RUCT={1} to RUCT={1,3} and create 
update report r3=(n(30),p(310)), then transfer them 
forwards. The history record of Node 3 will be updated 
with r3=(n(30),p(310)).
At time 3, in the same way, Node 2 will change 
RUCT={1,3} to RUCT={1,3,2} and create r2=
(n(230),p(20)), then transfer them forwards to other 
neighbor nodes. Similarly, the local record of Node 2 
will be updated with 2hr =(n(230),p(20)).
At time 4, Node 1 receives r2=(n(230),p(20)) from 
Node 2. Then Node 1 should change optimal path and 
create new update report r1=(n(10),p(120)) which is 
equal to negative report of history record 1hr =(n(120),
p(10)), i.e. 1hr . In addition, network ID of Node 1 has 
been included in the received RUCT= {1,3,2}, which 
means the update report chain loops. Therefore we can 
assure that route oscillation will occur at Node 1. 
We compare this approach based on RUCT (signed 
by RUCT) with approach based on relative prefer-
ence[21] (signed by RP) and approach based on TO-
KEN[22] (signed by TOKEN). Both RP and TOKEN 
respect privacy of routing policies and have optimal 
ultimate route tree after eliminating oscillation, which 
means they are typically similar researches with RUCT. 
Figs.10-11 show the comparison of on checking time 
and cost between three approaches. The results demon-
strate that RUCT is available and efficient. 
Fig.10 shows the comparison result of checking time 
whose unit is one MRAI. The checking time of RP is 
the largest among three approaches, which is more than 
triple of TOKEN’s when MAX_TIMES of RP (upper 
limit of conflicts) is 4. And the checking time of RUCT  
Fig.10  Comparison of checking time. 
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Fig.11  Comparison of BGP cost. 
is the smallest, which is half of TOKEN’s. 
Fig.11 shows the comparison result of BGP cost. 
The cost of RP is the least among three approaches, 
which spends constantly one byte, viz. relative prefer-
ence. The cost of TOKEN is constant too, which is 
occupied by attribute flag of node and conflict path 
after being encrypted. The cost of RUCT is an incre-
mental variable about number of nodes, which is less 
than cost of TOKEN if the number is small and should 
exceed cost of TOKEN if the number is too large. 
However, the total BGP cost of RUCT is very finite 
because network ID spends merely few bytes. There-
fore, RUCT cannot markedly aggravate network cost 
of BGP. 
One thing to be noted is that RUCT requires no ad-
ditional transmission cost because it is merely a path 
attribute carried by BGP update report. But the number 
of nodes included in RUCT is restrained by the maxi-
mum message size of BGP update report. As is known 
to all, the maximum message size of BGP update report 
is 4 096 bytes, which covers 19-byte BGP head and 
other necessary properties. So the number of nodes 
included in RUCT is actually less than 1 000 when 
network ID of each node occupies 4 bytes. 
5. Conclusions 
(1) The RUCT based approach can greatly respect 
the privacy of routing policies of AS when checking 
route oscillation.  
(2) Compared with other similar approaches, the 
proposed approach spends the smallest checking time 
by equivalent network cost of BGP. 
(3) This approach only focuses on consecutive posi-
tive-negative report in local record. The multi-phase 
state conversion of local reports will be possibly stud-
ied in future. 
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